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The Mental Health Act 1983 provides for detention and also for treatment which would otherwise
be an assault. As such, it allows for interference with the fundamental rights to liberty and to self-
determination. Particularly as it does so in the context of a branch of medicine which is often
highly subjective, it is hardly surprising that litigation is occasionally resorted to by those affected
who wish to challenge the legality of what is occurring to them. 
The framework for this litigation has developed, spurred on in particular by the growth of public
law and human rights law. As a result, mental health professionals have to be familiar not just with
the court-machinery which is central to the Mental Health Act 1983 (which provides for the
Mental Health Review Tribunal to determine the legality of the ongoing detention of a patient, and
refers the issue of the displacement of a nearest relative to the county court) but also with the
courts which deal with questions of public law (in particular the Administrative Court) and the
civil litigation courts.
Public Law
The last quarter of the Twentieth Century saw a significant growth of public law, with an increased
jurisdiction assumed by the High Court to intervene in the decisions of inferior courts and
decision-makers by way of the process of judicial review. Mental health law was caught in this
trend; for example, decisions of Mental Health Review Tribunals1 but also decisions of mental
health professionals to “section” or renew the detention of a patient2 were subject to challenge by
way of judicial review.
Mental health law has been at the forefront of the further invigoration of public law in the era
since the Human Rights Act 1998 was ushered in on 2 October 2000. The first declaration of
incompatibility to stand was made in relation to the powers of a Tribunal under ss72 and 73 of the
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1 Encouragement was given to use judicial review rather
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1983 Act3 and two further declarations have so far been made4. In addition, the first action taken
by a Minister to amend a primary statute by way of delegated legislation in the form of a Human
Rights Act Remedial Order was also a mental health matter.5
Judicial Review Since the Human Rights Act 1998
The further growth of challenges to the legality of decisions made in a mental health law context
can be traced to three major developments arising from the Human Rights Act 1998. The first is
the development of the test for intervention by way of judicial review. Traditionally, a judicial
review would only succeed if there were significant procedural defects in the decision-making
process or the decision was irrational (the so-called Wednesbury unreasonableness test6); however,
the courts now have to be more willing to examine the merits of a decision which interferes with
fundamental rights guaranteed under the European Convention, by reviewing not just whether a
decision maker exercised a rational judgment but also whether a proportionate balancing decision
was reached7.
The second development is linked and is the extended scope of fact-finding (and hence evidence in
the course of hearings) in judicial review proceedings. The case which made plain that this was
necessary in order to comply with the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention, the
right to a fair trial in relation to civil rights, was R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor and Others8. In essence,
the ruling here was that where fundamental rights are involved, the courts do not simply review
the rationality of a decision but make their own judgment, including determining as between
competing medical opinions as to whether a particular form of treatment would breach Articles 2,
3 and 8 of the Convention (which would require the doctors to attend and be cross-examined).
This was necessary to provide compliance with the right to a fair trial under Article 6.
The case of Wilkinson was an interlocutory appeal on a point of practice, namely whether it was
necessary for doctors to attend to give evidence. It has been applied in practice in the case of R (N)
v A Hospital and Others9. In this case, a High Court judge made the determination on contested
evidence of whether a particular course of treatment should be allowed in light of the patient’s
rights under Article 3 and Article 8, which turned on issues of the correct diagnosis of the
patient’s condition and whether forced depot medication was in a patient’s best interests. Although
in upholding the decision the Court of Appeal10 noted that live evidence would not always be
essential, the jurisdiction of the court to make the contested decision is clear.
The same fact-finding jurisdiction has been used in another mental health law context, namely the
issue of whether a nearest relative had objected to an application being made to admit a patient
3 R (H) v London North and East Region Mental
Health Review Tribunal [2002] QB 1, [2001] Mental
Health Law Reports 48
4 The regime for the release of life sentence prisoners
transferred to hospital under ss47 and 49 of the 1983
Act (R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2003] Mental Health Law Reports 193 –
see now s295 Criminal Justice Act 2003) and the
absence of a provision to allow a patient to change his
or her nearest relative under s29 of the Act (R (M) v
Secretary of State for Health [2003] Mental Health
Law Reports 348
5 The Mental Health Act 1983 (Remedial) Order 2001,
SI 2001 No 3712
6 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
7 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2001] 2 AC 532
8 [2002] 1 WLR 419, [2001] Mental Health Law
Reports 224
9 [2003] Mental Health Law Reports 138
10 [2003] 1 WLR 562, [2003] Mental Health Law
Reports 157
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under s3 of the 1983 Act11 and it has also been used in different contexts, such as whether a search
warrant was lawfully executed12.
The third development has been the growth of challenges by one public law body to the decisions
of another public law body, particularly challenges to decisions of Mental Health Review
Tribunals by hospitals and after-care authorities. This is a consequence of the need to accord
appropriate weight to the fact that a Tribunal is a judicial body which, to comply with Article 5(4)
of the Convention, has to have the power to order the release of an unlawfully detained psychiatric
patient. The issue of lawfulness here includes the question of whether the merits of the need to
detain are made out.
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, if the mental health professionals believed that a decision to
discharge a patient was wrong, they were able to arrange for the patient to be re-sectioned if they
felt that the criteria were met13. Indeed the duty to make an application if it were thought
appropriate, under s13 of the 1983 Act, could be said to require such an application. However, the
situation has had to be revisited pursuant to the duty imposed on the courts under s3 of the 1998
Act to strive to interpret legislation so that it is compatible with Convention rights, which has
required that previous authorities be revisited despite the common law’s adherence to the doctrine
of precedent. The new position is that a Tribunal decision is to be respected and allowed to stand
unless it can be shown that there was information of which the Tribunal was not aware which puts
a significantly different complexion on the case (such as the patient reneging on an undertaking to
take medication or a deterioration in the patient’s condition)14.
As a result of these developments, the Administrative Court’s case load in relation to challenges
to the lawfulness of decisions in the mental health context has seen a significant growth.15
Habeas Corpus
One of the other consequences of the growth of judicial review has been a diminution in the use
of the remedy of Habeas Corpus, the remedy whereby a challenge to the jurisdiction to detain can
be brought in front of the High Court. It was the remedy used in the leading case of Re S–C16,
which involved a challenge to the right of the hospital to detain someone when the application was
fundamentally flawed because the nearest relative objected. However, in B v Barking, Havering and
Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust17, which involved an allegation that the renewal of
detention was fundamentally flawed, a differently constituted Court of Appeal suggested that
judicial review should be the remedy sought. It is certainly possible to have judicial review cases
heard speedily18 and the right to seek bail in the course of judicial review proceedings allows a
detainee to be released in a short time-scale if the merits are clear.
11 R (PG) v LB Ealing and Others [2002] Mental
Health Law Reports 140
12 R (H) v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2002]
Police Law Reports 350
13 R v Managers of South Western Hospital ex p M
[1993] QB 683
14 R v East London and The City Mental Health Trust
ex p von Brandenburg [2003] UKHL 58
15 A very simplistic approach is to look at the volume of
cases in the Mental Health Law Reports: the 2002 and
2003 volumes are double the size of the 1999 volume.
16 [1996] QB 599
17 [1999] 1 FLR 106
18 The Administrative Court has a separate form, the
N463, whereby an applicant for judicial review can
seek an urgent hearing, and interim relief
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One of the controversial areas of the law of Habeas Corpus is the power of the High Court to
review the sufficiency of evidence on the basis of which a person is detained19. In R v Board of
Control ex p Rutty20, the High Court granted a writ of Habeas Corpus to secure the release of a
person detained under the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 on the basis that the stipendiary magistrate
who made the order did not have sufficient evidence that the patient had been “found neglected”,
as required before a committal order could be made under the statute. A similar conclusion has
recently been reached in R (Kenneally) v Snaresbrook Crown Court21, in which the release of a patient
was ordered on the basis that the Crown Court judge had erred in finding that he had the
jurisdiction to make a hospital order under s51 of the 1983 Act22, which requires that it be
“impracticable or inappropriate to bring the detainee before the court”. The factual circumstances
were that the patient was in the cells of the court, and it was his counsel’s request that s51 be
invoked: however, the High Court held that the statutory language had to be construed
restrictively, requiring a level of disablement such that it was inappropriate for the patient to be
brought to court, and the judge had misdirected himself as to the law in using the power. There
had been a parallel application for Habeas Corpus in case the time limit rules applicable to judicial
review had caused a problem23, though this was adjourned when permission to bring the judicial
review proceedings was granted with a time extension of just under 4 years24.
Both Rutty and Kenneally involved what might be seen as procedural prerequisites for detention
which were separate from the central medical question of whether the detainee suffered from a
mental disorder of the necessary nature or degree. However, there is nothing in principle to prevent
the jurisdiction of the High Court from being exercised in this regard. The Court has
demonstrated that it is willing to review whether the prerequisites of the jurisdiction to detain are
made out, and is willing to enter into the arena of medical disputes. Consequently, the existence
of an “unsound mind” of the necessary nature or degree, established by adequate evidence25 is a
matter fit for judicial determination. 
Those detained under the civil provisions of s3 of the 1983 Act are the subject of a public law
decision which is open to challenge in the High Court; the right to apply to a Mental Health Review
Tribunal is not an alternative remedy (it being a principle of judicial review that other avenues of
appeal are exhausted first) because the Tribunal considers not the lawfulness of the original
detention but the position of the patient at the date it meets. There is the practical fact that it might
be possible to have a Tribunal consider the case more quickly than the High Court, which will have
to allow time for the relevant medical evidence to be compiled and for the case to be listed.
19 See Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 2nd Ed
(OUP 1989) pp79–85; it is a jurisdiction clearly
accepted in extradition cases
20 [1956] 2 QB 109
21 [2002] QB 1169, [2001] Mental Health Law Reports
53
22 s51(5) and (6) provide that if a transfer direction has
been made in respect of a remand prisoner, it is
impracticable or inappropriate to bring the detainee to
court, and there is evidence from 2 doctors that the
transferred prisoner is suffering from mental illness or
severe mental impairment making detention in hospital
for medical treatment appropriate, the court may make
a hospital order without convicting him if it is proper
to do so; a restriction order may also be imposed. 
23 Judicial review proceedings have to be commenced
promptly and in any event within 3 months of the
decision challenged: see CPR 54.5. However, the Court
may extend the time limit if there is good reason for delay
24 See the note to the report of the case in [2002] Mental
Health Law Reports 53
25 In other words, the criteria for deprivation of liberty
under Art 5(1)(e) of the European Convention as
interpreted in Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2
EHRR 387, which is reflected in ss3 and 37 of the
1983 Act
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In relation to those detained under a s37 hospital order by the Magistrates Court, there is a right
of appeal to the Crown Court in the first instance, which has jurisdiction to examine the merits of
the making of an order; the ruling of the Crown Court on appeal can be taken to the High Court.
In relation to those detained under s37 by the Crown Court following a trial on indictment, the
appeal route is to the Court of Appeal rather than by way of judicial review26: the fact that there
is a prospect of appeal on the merits supports the contention that the High Court, when it has
jurisdiction by way of judicial review, should be willing to examine whether there is proper
evidence that a person is of “unsound mind” so as to require detention.
Other Public Law Cases
In addition to the jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review and habeas corpus cases, mental
health practitioners should also be aware of other courts which may take decisions. In particular,
the Family Division of the High Court has jurisdiction to make declarations as to the lawfulness
or otherwise of treatment plans27. It should also be noted that inquests are potentially of much
greater significance in instances where there are deaths arising from inadequate care and treatment.
Although the rules relating to inquests do not generally allow findings of neglect28, the obligations
which arise under Article 2 of the European Convention to investigate deaths which have occurred
when a person is in the custody of the State mean that it is permissible to return a finding of
systemic neglect (as opposed to neglect by an individual) when to do so will allow compliance with
this procedural duty under Article 2 and reduce the risks of repetition of a death in similar
circumstances: R (Middleton) v HM Coroner29.
Private Law – Potential Tort Actions and Damages
Mental health law challenges to the lawfulness of a particular decision may also involve challenges
framed in private law. The usual remedy available in such circumstances is a claim for damages,
although injunctions to prevent or occasionally compel certain steps may be involved. (An
injunction can be granted in judicial review proceedings, which can also include a claim for
damages. Proceedings may be transferred from the Administrative Court to the Queen’s Bench
Division of the High Court once the public law element of the claim has been determined30.)
26 The High Court’s jurisdiction by way of judicial
review is excluded by s29 of the Supreme Court Act
1981
27 As a recent example of this, see In re W [2002]
Mental Health Law Reports 411, in which it was
declared that a psychopathically disordered prisoner
was competent to refuse treatment in relation to various
self-inflicted wounds which he was trying to make
septic as part of a campaign to be transferred from
prison to hospital.
28 R v HM Coroner for North Humberside and
Scunthorpe ex p Jamieson [1995] QB 1
29 [2003] QB 581, [2002] Prison Law Reports 100.
30 See CPR 54.3(2), which indicates that a claim for
judicial review may involve a claim for damages,
though not as the only remedy; see also s31(4) of the
Supreme Court Act 1981. CPR 54.20 provides that
the Administrative Court may direct the transfer of a
case. Note, however, that a transfer will not always
occur and the judge may make an immediate
assessment of any damages. 
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1. False Imprisonment
False imprisonment is, in essence, detention without lawful authority. The House of Lords has
confirmed that this is a tort of strict liability in the case of R v Governor of Brockhill Prison 
ex p Evans (No 2)31. The facts of this case are fairly stark. The prisoner was detained on the basis
of an honest sentence calculation which was correct in law until the law was changed in ex p Evans
(No 1)32, when the cases on which the governor had relied were effectively overruled. Because the
legal theory is that the courts determine what the law has always been, in that they do not change
the law just from the date of the judgment, the detention became unlawful, albeit retrospectively,
and so damages were awarded at a level of £5000 for 59 additional days.
It follows that an action in false imprisonment is a possible consequence of detention in hospital
without the cover of lawful authority. In mental health cases, lawful authority is provided by either
the Mental Health Act 1983 or common law, so it is necessary to check whether the many
requirements of the statute or common law have been complied with. There is scope for argument
as to various of the specific requirements, but it should be noted that: 
(i) s6 of the Act provides that a “duly completed” application is authority to convey to hospital
within a set time and, on admission, is “sufficient authority for the managers to detain the
patient in the hospital in accordance with the provisions of this Act”. Clearly, it is important
that the application is duly completed, though there is an additional safeguard for hospitals in
that s6(3) provides that an application which “appears to be duly made and to be founded on
the necessary medical recommendations may be acted upon without further proof of the
signature or qualification of the person by whom the application or any such medical
recommendation is made or given or of any matter of fact or opinion stated in it”. There may
be scope for argument about whether an apparently duly completed form which is not in fact
duly completed amounts to detention “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” as
required by Article 5 of the European Convention33. The High Court is able to look behind the
apparent due completion and grant habeas corpus if the form is inaccurate34.
(ii) An admission order made under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead)
Act 1991 provides authority to convey to the hospital designated by the Home Secretary and
to detain. (See also the place of safety powers of the Crown Court under Schedule 1 to the 1991
Act.) A failure to designate the appropriate hospital within the time scale set by the Act, namely
2 months, arguably takes away the jurisdiction to detain.
(iii) See also police powers under s135/136 of the 1983 Act, which have various procedural
requirements which ought to be construed strictly as the right to liberty is involved.
31 [2001] 2 AC 19
32 [1997] QB 443
33 In R(A) v Harrow Crown Court [2003] Mental
Health Law Reports 393, the High Court held that a
hospital order which was ultra vires (and should have
been an admission order) was valid until set aside – as
an order of a superior court: R v Cain [1985] AC 46.
Further, as a substantially fair procedure had been
followed before the erroneous order of similar effect
was made, there was no breach of Art 5. However, the
judge drew a distinction (at para 24) between the case
of a court-ordered detention and an administrative act.
34 Re S–C
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(iv) The common law allows detention in a situation of necessity of a person of unsound mind
who is a danger to himself and others; necessity requires a manifest danger to the patient or
others: see Black v Forsey35.
In addition to the procedural requirements, there is the question of the substantive merits of the
detention – ie, is the mental disorder such as to justify detention. The discussion above of the cases
of Rutty and Kenneally applies in relation to the question of damages as well: the public law remedy
which may result in an order for the release of the patient can be followed by a private law remedy
in the form of damages. 
The lawful authority to detain must be continuing. At this point, the issue of the merits becomes
more important (though there are procedures to be followed, in particular compliance with s20 of
the 1983 Act in relation to compulsory but non-restricted patients). For example, in R v Riverside
Mental Health Trust ex p Huzzey36, an error made by the managers in considering whether to uphold
a barring order made under s25 of the Act following an application to discharge by a nearest
relative (in that they considered the s3 test rather than the additional dangerousness criterion in
s25) rendered false the detention between that time and the patient’s release some 12 weeks later
on the direction of a Tribunal, which in turn lead a jury to award him £24000 in compensatory
damages and £2000 in aggravated damages37. 
The issue of the merits of detention is usually dealt with by the Mental Health Review Tribunal,
and two issues frequently arise. First: if the Tribunal orders discharge and the patient is soon re-
sectioned, is that lawful? As explained above, the answer is basically not unless there has been a
change in circumstances38. 
The second issue is what happens when a Tribunal orders a deferred discharge but conditions are
not met, leading to the continued detention of the patient. As it stands, if the impasse is because
a professional judgment stands in the way, there is little that can be done in domestic law to force
the discharge through: so, when a community responsible medical officer refused to take a patient,
the courts did not intervene39; equally, when a social worker would not approve a hostel, the courts
did not intervene with what was held to be a rational judgment40. There has been a development in
the law in that, in relation to the deferred conditional discharge of a restricted patient, the Tribunal
is able to be retain supervisory powers over the meeting of conditions and may modify them if it
35 1987 SLT 681. Note also there is a general common
law power to detain to prevent a breach of the peace,
and a now-statutory power to use reasonable force to
prevent crime (s3 Criminal Law Act 1967); and
necessity allows emergency medical treatment of
incapable patients. The situation of patients covered by
the case of R v Bournewood Community and Mental
Health NHS Trust ex p L [1999] 1 AC 458 should
also be considered; the decision of the European Court
of Human Rights on this situation is awaited.
36 (1998) 43 BMLR 167
37 see Jones, Mental Health Act Manual, 8th Ed, 1–293
38 This change in practice also has implications for the
quality of reasons required by a Tribunal because those
involved in the fresh process of sectioning the patient
may not know what evidence was given to the Tribunal
and why it discharged the patient: hence, the previous
view that the reasons of a Tribunal could be limited as
they were given to an “informed audience” which know
the evidence presented and the arguments made is no
longer adequate. See R (H) v Ashworth Hospital
[2003] 1 WLR 127, [2002] Mental Health Law
Reports 314.
39 R (K) v Camden and Islington Health Authority
[2002] QB 198, [2001] Mental Health Law Reports
24
40 R (W) v Doncaster City Council [2003] EWHC 193
(Admin): the judge granted permission to appeal, and
one of the issues raised is whether a breach of the
Convention deprives the detention of its lawfulness for
the purposes of the tort of false imprisonment and, if
so, whether it is the detaining hospital or the after-care
authorities who are liable. The appeal is due to be
heard in March 2004.
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is not possible to persuade those involved to put the conditions into effect, though arguments
remain as to whether this amounts to compliance with Article 5(4) of the Convention, the need for
a Court to be able to order release if the merits of detention is not made out41. The European
Court has held that the absence of powers to ensure that a deferred conditional discharge is put
into effect without unreasonable delay amounts to a breach of the Convention42. 
The issue of damages in this context is made plain by the fact that Article 5(5) of the Convention
requires a right to compensation for those detained in breach of Article 5 of the Convention43.
One final point to mention here is the effect of s139 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which in
essence provides a defence for actions purportedly done under the Act in the absence of bad faith
or the lack of reasonable care, except in relation to actions against the Secretary of State or a health
authority or trust: the fact that this imposes a fault requirement for actions brought by those who
are or are alleged to be mentally disordered in what is otherwise a strict liability tort may raise
arguments under Article 14 (prohibition on discrimination). Although the more restrictive
provisions of the predecessor of s139 was upheld in Ashingdane v UK44, this was on the basis that
there was not an improper breach of the right of access to a Court guaranteed by Article 6 of the
Convention and it does not appear to be have been argued that there was a breach of Article 14.
2. Assault
The cases of Wilkinson and N make it plain that detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 does
not necessarily authorise the imposition of such treatment as the Responsible Medical Officer
indicates should be administered. There are some statutory procedural hurdles to overcome in
certain situations (including use of medication for more than 3 months): see ss56ff of the Act.
However, even if the statutory pre-requisites have been met, including approval from the Second
Opinion Appointed Doctor, the matter may be litigated if there is a proper argument that the
proposed treatment is not authorised by the statute or is not in the best interests of the patient. It
has always to be remembered that the fact that there is authority to treat against the wishes of the
patient does not mean that it will necessarily follow: see, for example, para 16.11 of the Code of
Practice issued under s118 of the 1983 Act.
Typically this sort of dispute will be based on arguments that the patient has been misdiagnosed,
or that the nature or degree of the illness does not require a course of treatment as invasive as that
proposed. The role of the Court is to ensure that Articles 3 and 8, and perhaps Article 2 in some
circumstances, are respected: (i) Article 3 requires that treatment is convincingly shown to be a
medical necessity; (ii) Article 8 requires that the treatment be a proportionate response45.
The other issue which may arise in relation to treatment is whether a particular treatment is
medical treatment for the purposes of the Act: in this regard, it should be noted that “medical
treatment” is widely defined in s145 of the Act and that “treatment for mental disorder” can
41 R (IH) v Home Secretary [2003] QB 320, [2002]
Mental Health Law Reports 87. This decision was
upheld by the House of Lords ([2003] UKHL 59),
which unfortunately declined to grapple with the
important question of whether the community
psychiatrist is a public authority and so bound by the
Human Rights Act 1998 to act in a way which does
not breach Article 5.
42 Johnson v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 296
43 This includes the failure to have a speedy review, as
required by Article 5(4): see below.
44 (1979) 2 EHRR 387
45 See Herczegfalvy v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437 as
applied in Wilkinson and N.
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include treatment ancillary to the core treatment or designed to relieve the symptoms of
disorder46.
These issues can be litigated by way of judicial review or claims for assault and/or breach of the
Human Rights Act 1998, all with interim injunctions likely to be sought.
3. Breach of Human Rights Act 1998 
The Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for public authorities (a concept which is co-extensive
with bodies amenable to judicial review) to breach Convention rights unless required to do so by
a primary statutory provision: s6 Human Rights Act 1998. Section 7 of the Act allows action to
be taken, and the remedies may include damages if such an award is necessary to afford just
satisfaction to the Claimant. The case law in relation to this is currently being developed: as an
example, see R (KB and Others) v Mental Health Review Tribunal and Secretary of State47, in which
damages were ordered for the majority of a number of claimants whose rights to a speedy Tribunal
decision as guaranteed by Article 5(4) of the Convention had been breached (including some whose
detention was upheld). This is a useful adjunct to claims phrased in false imprisonment (and may
be the only claim if the courts decide that a detention which is unlawful in Convention terms but
otherwise lawful in domestic law does not give rise to a claim in false imprisonment). Claims
phrased in assault can also usually be supplemented by a claim for a breach of Articles 3 or 8, and
claims for breach of Article 8 may be used in many areas48.
4. Negligence and Other Torts
As a matter of presenting the complete picture, it should be noted that the law of professional
negligence applies to the relationship between doctor and patient (and other professionals), and if
damage is caused by a negligent failure in treatment, damages can be awarded. However, note that
there is no duty of care arising directly from s117 of the Act if the doctor-patient relationship had
not been formed49. It is also possible that other torts will be made out on the particular facts: note,
in particular, that torts such as misfeasance in a public office are developing. The mental health
sphere is also one which involves information protected by confidentiality, and the Article 8 right
to protection of privacy: a failure to maintain confidentiality may be actionable by way of the tort
of breach of confidence50.
46 See also the relevant case law, particularly Reid v
Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 2 AC 512; for
example, in B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam
133, tube feeding was authorised for someone who
suffered from a personality disorder which caused her
to self-harm.
47 [2003] Mental Health Law Reports 1 (for the
argument on liability) and 28 (for the argument as to
damages)
48 In Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 3 WLR 1137,
the House of Lords held that it was not proper to use
the Convention to modify the common law and create a
tort of breach of privacy: but it was noted that any
gaps in protection offered by existing remedies in areas
covered by Art 8 are now met by the claims available
under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
49 Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority
[1998] QB 978
50 See as an example Cornelius v De Taranto [2000]
Mental Health Law Reports 145 and, on appeal,
[2001] Mental Health Law Reports 217. See also
Fenella Morris, JMHL, July 2003. 
